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COMPARATIVE ASPECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
CHRLESs SZLADITS*
INTRODUCTION
T HE comparative study of law provides no experience more fascinating or
more "traumatic," in the opinion of one distinguished comparatist,1 than
the discovery of the various legal solutions to almost identical social and economic
problems, obtained by employing different legal techniques. "[U]nder similar
social, economic, cultural pressures in similar societies the law is apt to change
by means of sometimes radically different legal techniques. The ends are
determined by society, the means by legal tradition."2 While frequently helpful,
legal tradition sometimes raises obstacles to the process of adaptation of legal
to extra-legal developments. One interesting example of this process is provided
by the growth of product liability, the judicial efforts to adjust to modern
economic conditions the legal protection accorded to the consuming public
against manufacturers and other suppliers of goods for injuries arising from their
use.
This body of law has been thrust into the foreground by fundamental
changes in the processing and marketing of goods in technically advanced
societies. Paralleling the leadership of the United States in production and
marketing of standardized products are American innovations in finding
equitable solutions for the legal problem posed. This same problem has also
had to be faced by the law of Germany and France. An attempt is made here
to describe the different means by which these legal systems have sought to
overcome the existing legal obstacles, obstacles which reflect legal values of an
earlier and different social organization.
It may be useful to begin with a summary survey of the phases of
development of product liability in the United States and Britain.3
I. AmmxicA LAW
Two major distinctions can be drawn concerning the liability of suppliers
of chattels: (a) between the defendant's liability to the person supplied directly
by him, and the defendant's liability to a third person; and (b) between
liability based on negligence, and liability based on a doctrine of strict
liability, which in this field has become associated with the term "warranty."
Strictly speaking, product liability is liability of the supplier or manufacturer
* Adjunct Professor of Comparative Law, Parker School of Foreign and Comparative
Law, Columbia University.
1. Kahn-Freund, Comparative Law as an Academic Subject: An Inaugural Lecture 10
(1965).
2. Ibid.
3. For a discussion of the law, see Prosser, Torts §§ 95-97, at 648-89 (3d ed. 1964);
2 Harper & James, Torts §§ 28.1-28.33, at 1535-1606 (1956); Fleming, Torts 466-81 (2d
ed. 1961); Salmond, Torts 423-40 (14th ed. 1965).
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of goods to third persons.4 Today, it may be either liability based on negligence,
or it may be strict liability, i.e., liability without fault.
Initially liability to third persons based on negligence ran into difficulty.
The obstacle was the requirement of "privity of contract" between the
manufacturer or seller and the injured party, a requirement which originated
in the much discussed case of Winterbottom v. Wright,5 decided in 1842. It was
there held that one who had let a mail coach to the plaintiff's employer with an
undertaking to keep it in repair was not liable to the coachman who was injured
by the collapse of a defective axle. Narrowly construed, this only meant that A
cannot ground a claim against B on the breach of a contract between B and C
to which A is not a party; but Lord Abinger, C. B., went further. He said that
there was "no privity of contract between these two parties," and that if the
plaintiff could sue, there would follow "the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit."6 Thus the decision was interpreted
in the wider sense, that conduct which constitutes a breach of a contractual
obligation to C could not concurrently furnish a cause of action in tort for breach
of a duty of care owed to A. This fallacy supported the conclusion that the
manufacturer of a defective article owed a duty only to those who were in
contractual privity with him. The courts, however, soon found exceptions to
the rule, such as the intentional concealment of a defect in an article, or its
"imminent" or "inherent" danger to human safety.7 At last, in 1916, in the
famous decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 8 Judge Cardozo adopted
the principle of liability for articles dangerous if negligently made, and by doing
so he "caused the exception to swallow the asserted rule of nonliability."D This
doctrine has received an ever-widening application, 0 and was followed in
England by the House of Lords in 1932.11 It has been applied to hold responsible
the manufacturer of a component part of a product,' 2 to compensate all persons
whose injury in the course of the product's use was foreseeable,' 3 and to include
recovery for property damage as well as for bodily injury.14 The term "manufac-
turer" has also been greatly widened and now applies to repairers, and even to
makers of tombstonesl
The MacPherson doctrine is based on negligence. The duty of care relates
to design, plan, structure, and specifications of the product, and to liability
4. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, § 95, at 648.
5. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
6. Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
7. The leading case is Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
8. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
9. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946).
10. For a comprehensive survey of the present scope of the privity rule, see Annot.,
74 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1960).
11. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.).
12. See, e.g., Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
13. See, e.g., McLeod v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
14. See, e.g., Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958). See also the cases in Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability (2
vols. 1961).
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for defects. The difficulties of proof of negligence-as there is hardly ever
direct proof of what happened at the manufacturer's plant-is relaxed by
reliance upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.'5
Strict liability of the manufacturer, on the other hand, is based on the
theory of a breach of a warranty that the product was properly made. Here
the requirement of privity is of greater relevance, since warranty is regarded as
an incident to a contract of sale and is supposed to run to the benefit of the
purchaser only. However, the courts have held that under modern marketing
conditions privity of contract is not always a requisite for breach-of-warranty
recoveries. The manufacturer, by placing goods upon the market and by
promoting their purchase, represents to the public that they are safe and
suitable for use; this is construed as an implied warranty to the ultimate pur-
chaser that they are reasonably fit for use. Liability without privity of contract
was first imposed where defective food and drink were involved,:6 but in the
late fifties it was applied to various products, including automobiles,17 airplanes,' 8
electric cables, grinding wheels, and many other articles. Although at first
recovery against the manufacturer was allowed only in favor of the ultimate
purchaser who, though not in a direct relationship, could be regarded as linked
to the manufacturer by a chain of contracts, the courts have shown a tendency
to permit recovery by persons whose use is foreseeable.19 The extension of war-
ranty in a contract of sale in favor of third parties has been accepted by the
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-318, entitled "Third Party Beneficiaries of
Warranties Express or Implied," provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
It has been pointed out that recently several cases have raised the possibility
that the further development of product liability may be affected and even
controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code.
20
15. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, § 96, at 671. In Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills,
Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85 (Austl.), where the maxim res ipsa loquitur was applied, the onus of
proof was in effect shifted to the defendant; it was for the manufacturer to show that a
cause outside his sphere of responsibility had intervened. As Lord Wright said, "The appel-
lant is not required to lay his finger on the exact person in all the chain who was responsible."
(Id. at 110).
16. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 136 Pac. 633 (1913); Jackson
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914).
17. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
18. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsmann Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
19. See cases dted supra, notes 17 and 18.
20. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De.
fective-Products Cases, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 974 (1966); and Rapson, Products Liability Unde
Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liabilit
in Tort, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 692 (1965).
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All this shows the awareness of the American courts and their quick response
to problems in this field posed by the modern marketing and mass-production
economy.
II. ENGLISH LAW
English law has not followed this most useful-albeit somewhat forced-
extension of the implied warranty principle. It is true that by implied warranties
the seller in English law has become in effect an insurer of its goods with
reference to their quality and fitness. 2' This liability for absolute warranty
arises irrespective of any negligence and covers not only injury to person or
property, but also economic loss. But this protection merely covers the buyer,
and the privity of contract concept has prevented its extension to other
consumers and, moreover, has excluded the possibility of direct recovery
against the manufacturer. Such an extension would probably be considered a
complete abandonment of the principle.
III. GERMAx LAW
The question of product liability has recently aroused interest in Germany,
especially because as of yet no satisfactory solution has been found for the
problems it raises.22 German law is a codified law and the principles and rules
governing liability both in contract and in tort must be found in code provisions,
generally in the German Civil Code, the Biirgerliche Gesetzbuch.23 This remark-
able code, which the French legal scholar Saleilles considered the greatest legal
work of the century,24 was the product of a society where the mill, the smithy,
the brewery, and the factory were the centers of industrial activity, where
agriculture was still predominant, and where not too much attention was paid
to new technical developments and industrial production.25 This code, it was
said, "seems to be rather the closing chord of the nineteenth than the overture
to the twentieth century." 26 This makes it all the more remarkable that it has
proved flexible enough to respond to the challenges of modern times without the
21. The Sales of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 14 gives statutory force to a
warranty (a) of fitness for a particular purpose where this purpose was made known by
the buyer, expressedly or by implication, to the seller, and (b) of the merchantable quality
of goods bought by description. See 22 Halsbury, Statutes of England 993-94 (2d ed. 1950).
22. Among the textbooks only Esser, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts has a special section
dealing with the question [§ 204(5)(c) at 874 (2d ed. 1960)]. There are however several
valuable studies and articles dealing with it: Lorenz, Rechtsvergleichendes zur Haftung des
Warenherstellers und Lieferanten gegeniiber Dritten, in Festschrift fUr H. Nottarp 59-89
(1961); Simitis, Grundfragen der Produzentenhaftung (Tilbingen 1965); Latt6, Schuldver-
trageliche Berziehungen zwischen Verbraucber und Hersteller (Diss. Berlin 1961); K. Miller,
Zur Haftung des Warenherstellers gegenfiber dem Endverbraucher, 165 Archly fUr dio
dvilistische Praxis [hereinafter cited AcP] 285 (1965); Markert, Die Schadenshaftung des
Warenherstellers gegenfiber dem Verbraucher, 19 Der Betriebs-Berater 231 (1964).
23. Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch vor 18 August 1896, effective 1 January 1900 [hereinafter
cited BGB].
24. Saleilles, Introduction a P'etude du droit civil allemand 3 (1904).
25. Simitis, op. cit. supra note 22, at 8.
26. Isele, Bin halbes Jahrhundert deutsches Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 150 AeP 3 (1949).
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need for fundamental reforms. This is due largely to the work of the courts,
which have skillfully adapted its provisions to new conditions. Of course, it was
sometimes found that the interpretative development of the law by the courts
(Rechtsfindung) could not stretch the principles contained in a provision any
further without abandoning them completely, and consequently some newly
emerging problems have not been adequately solved. Product liability is a good
example. Here we find that attempts to arrive at a just solution have been more
or less unsuccessful, and that a residue of problems continues to contend with
dogmatic principles.
According to German law, liability in damages, both in contract and in tort,
is based on fault (Verschulden). This means that either nonperformance of a
contractual obligation or an act causing damage to another must constitute a
fault, a reprehensible breach of a legal duty.27 The BGB does not define fault;
indeed, it scarcely uses the term, but merely refers to it circuitously.28
When we consider the liability of the manufacturer or producer of goods
for injuries caused to consumers generally, who are not in direct relation with
the manufacturer but may be at the end of a chain of legal relations, the
obvious remedy is a tort claim. The relevant provision for tort liability is
Article 823 of the BGB, which reads as follows:
A person who, wilfully or negligently, without legal right, injures the
life, body, health, freedom, property or any other right of another, is
bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.
A person who infringes a statutory provision intended for the protection
of others incurs the same obligation. If, according to the purview of
the statute, infringement is possible even without any fault on the part
of the wrongdoer, the duty to make compensation arises only if some
fault can be imputed to him.
In addition to this general provision, some special types of conduct are explicitly
deemed to give rise to compensation: acts endangering the credit of another
(Art. 824), wilfully causing damage to another in a manner contra bonos mores
(Art. 826), and damage arising from neglect of certain duties of supervision or
maintenance (over persons, Art. 832; animals, Arts. 833 and 834; buildings,
Art. 836).
Thus it can be seen that German law represents a legal system where de-
27. Exceptions to this general principle in contract are the liability based on insurance
or warranty, and in tort, certain forms of strict liability established by special legal pro-
visions relating to so-called Gelfhrdungshaftung; e.g., damage caused by railways, airplanes,
etc.
28. It is used in BGB Art. 254: "If any fault of the injured party has contributed in
causing the injury . .. ," but in the principal provisions establishing contractual liability
(Art. 276) and tort liability (Art. 823), the term is avoided and "colorless" phrases used
instead; Esser, op. cit. supra note 22, at 185. Thus in Art. 276 the provision reads, "The
debtor is responsible, unless it is otherwise provided, for wilful default and negligence... "'
Art. 823 provides: "A person who, wilfully, or negligently, without legal right injures the
life, body, health, freedom, property or any other right of another is bound to compensate
him for any damage arising therefrom...." [Translations of BGB articles from Von
Mehren, The Civil Law System (1957)].
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
lictual liability is attached to specific acts, a situation which also existed in the
old Roman law and early English law. This contrasts with systems which rely
on a general clause of delictual liability.29 The draftsmen of the BGB, after some
hesitation, decided not to adopt such a general clause, and instead attempted to
enumerate the circumstances which would establish wrongful damage and thus
give rise to a tort claim. Consequently, there are three classes of tort in German
law: (1) illegal damage to the protected rights of life, body, health, liberty,
property, or any other right; (2) special conduct which injures rights and
interests of others; infringing statutory provisions protecting others; and (3)
conduct which wilfully damages another contra bonos mores. Thus, rather than
leave it to the courts to establish when injury to another is compensable within
the frame of a general liability clause, tortious acts are predetermined by the
code provisions.30
One consequence of this approach is that the number of protected interests
cannot be extended by judicial interpretation, and this rules out general liability
for negligence. 3' Another consequence is that, since a person's estate (Vermb'gen),
his total pecuniary interest, is not regarded as a right, 2 the effect of Article 823
is to restrict recovery largely to physical damage to person or property (which
is deemed to include interferences with the liberty of the person or with the title
to property).3s Purely pecuniary or economic damage, on the other hand, may
be actionable under Article 826, but the defendant's conduct must have been
contra bonos mores. Hence, if an action is brought for physical damage, mere
proof of negligence is sufficient,34 while pecuniary damage must have been in-
flicted intentionally. It must also be emphasized that physical damage must be
29. Examples are the French Code civil (Arts. 1382-83), the Austrian General Civil
Code (Art. 1295), the Swiss Code of Obligations (Art. 41), and the Italian C6dice Civie
(Art. 2043). Cf. Von Caemmerer, Wandlungen des Deliktrechts, [hereinafter cited Von
Caemmererl in 2 Hundert Jahre Deutsches Rechtsleben: Festscbrift zum Ilunderjibrigen
Besteben des Deutschen Juristentages 65 (1960).
30. Statutory protecting provisions (Schutzgesetze) are very numerous and to attempt
any enumeration of them would be futile. There are numerous German penal provisions pro-
tecting individual interests (e.g., Penal Code Art. 164, false accusation; Art. 172, adultery),
private laws protecting pecuniary interests (e.g., Copyright Law Art. 25, infringement of
copyright), penal and police laws in the general interest (e.g., Penal Code Art. 153, false
testimony; Art. 185, insult), and many more. Whenever such provisions are infringed, in
addition to the penal sanctions, a tort claim arises for the compensation of the person who
has been damaged by such infringement of the right or interest protected by that provision.
31. Of course there may still be liability based on the protective provisions indicated
by Art. 823, para. 2; e.g., slander, infringement of the secrecy of correspondence, or unlawful
competition (The latter is also within the scope of Art. 826.).
32. Enneccerus-Lehmann, Recht der Schuldverhaltnisse [hereinafter cited Enneccerus-
Lehmann] § 243.1e, at 944 (15th ed. 1958); Esser, Schuldrecht [hereinafter cited Esser]
§ 202/ib, cc at 845 (2d ed. 1960).
33. Thus, for instance, the director of a co-operative society who failed to enter timely
notice of the release of one member of the co-op with the court was sued by that member,
who, because of this failure, had to pay a considerable sum to the trustee in bankruptcy.
The director was found not liable on the basis of § 823, para. 1, "because no definite
interest of the plaintiff, only his estate as such, has been damaged." M. v. B., Reichsgericht
(III. Zivilsenat), 4 October 1904, 59 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
[hereinafter cited R.G.Z.] 49, 51 (1905).
34. Negligence is defined by the BGB as not using ordinary care (Art. 276).
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caused by an act that is actually unlawful,3 5 whereas under Article 826 the de-
fendant's conduct need only have been contra bonos mores.3 6
An unlawful injury may be caused37 either by an act or by an omission
on the part of the defendant. An omission, however, can constitute a ground for
liability in tort only if the defendant had a duty to act. It was at this point that
the German courts started to broaden the scope of tort liability by establishing
various duties of conduct which made it possible to find a defendant liable if by
an omission, by neglect of the required care, he endangered and caused damage
to the public. The rationale for the establishment of these duties was found in
the judge-made principle that everybody who enters into relations with the
public must take into consideration the position of the members of the public
and must take all precautions to avoid dangers which might result from his
relations with them. These duties to avoid dangers to the public are called
Verkehrssicherungspflichten.3s They may arise either from permitting access to
property or traffic through it by the public, from control of a thing which can
cause damage to the public (such as a house from whose roof ice or snow may
fall), or from exercise of a calling which requires special skills and care. While
all of these duties contributed to the development of product liability, it was this
last-the duty to exercise the special care and skill of one's calling-about which
the liability of the producer for injuries caused to members of the public by
defective products crystallized.
The original basis of the Verkehrssicherungspflichten was the idea that one
who makes land, streets or bridges accessible to the public must see to it that
they should be safe and not cause harm to the users. This duty was first extended
to owners of shops, restaurants, and houses,3 9 and since then has spread in
various directions: the manufacturer or dealer is liable, if negligent, for harm
caused to users or third parties by defects in design or defects in manufacture; 40
one who manufactures or sells machinery or implements must take care that these
should be safe and is liable for harm caused to third parties if he neglects this
duty; 41 one who places on the market goods which may be dangerous when used
35. Thus it must not have been rendered lawful by various grounds which may justify
the defendant's act (e.g., rules of self-defense and self-preservation).
36. Cf. Enneccerus-Lehmann § 234, at 938 et seq.
37. Causation according to German law requires "adequacy of causation" (adiquater
Kausalzsammenhang); that is, a showing that, according to the normal rules of life, a
situation such as the one produced by the act or fact should have resulted in the damage
that has actually been caused. Cf. Esser § 60/1; Enneccerus-Lehmann § 15.
38. See Esser § 204; Enneccerus-Lehmann § 234 II 2, at 946.
39. S. Sch. v. Stadtgemeinde W, Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat) 23 February 1903, 54
R.G.Z. 53, at 56 (one of the early decisions concerning the requirement to keep a road
dear of ice).
40. H.E.X. Comp. m.b.H. v. B., Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat) 17 January 1940, 163
R.G.Z. 21, at 26 (liability for injury to third parties by motor car established, because of
faulty construction of its brakes).
41. This duty does not, however, extend to persons who come to harm by inappropri-
ate use of the product involved. Thus where an adjustable hoist collapsed and the falling
bucket killed a man below, it was found that the hoist was safely constructed, but that it
had been improperly attached to the window. The court found the manufacturer not
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must take all precautions to safeguard against such dangers, 42 and especially to
warn of possible danger in the course of use; 43 one who produces foodstuffs must
take care that nothing harmful to health should be placed on the market.4 4 The
duty is imposed not only upon persons who have brought about a possible source
of danger, but also upon those who permit the danger to persist. 45 Moreover,
the exercise of a trade may establish special duties beyond the general duty of
care towards persons with whom the defendant may come in contact in the course
of his trade.46 Finally, the liability of the manufacturer (Hersteller) is imposed
not only upon the producer of the end-product, but also upon the manufacturer
of component parts.4 7
From all this, it can be seen that what actually happened was that the courts
made creative use of the code sources, and established what may be considered
a general duty to avoid negligently causing harm to others.48 Indeed, the
Bundesgerichtshof stated not long ago that "the judicial practice has long ago
gone beyond these duties to make commerce secure (verkehrssicher) in the
responsible, because when machinery is put on the market, the construction of which is
unobjectionable, the manufacturer cannot be expected to warn the customers against its
improper use; Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (VI. Zivilsenat), 14 April 1959, Versichrungs-
Recht [hereinafter cited Vers. R.I.
42. With regard to certain goods (usually chemicals), it is not always possible to
establish in advance the eventual harm they may cause. In such circumstances it is at least
the duty of the manufacturer or distributor not to assure the consumer about the harmless-
ness of the product, of which he cannot then be certain.
In a case involving a defrosting device, fire was caused as a result of overheating
produced-partially at least-by extensive rust damage in the pipes. The distributor was
found liable because, on the basis of the manufacturer's description, he had assured the
somewhat anxious users that no fire could result from the use of the device; judgment of
Bundesgerichtshof, 30 April 1963, Vers. R. 1963, at 860.
43. It has been held that the manufacturer is obliged to inform the user of a floor
sealer which produces inflammable gases of the dangers which may arise; the simple note
"inflammable" was insufficient. The manufacturer was held liable for damage caused by
fire to a third party as a result of careless use of the sealer; Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof,
20 October 1959, Vers. R. 1960, at 342.
44. An oil factory has been held liable for poisoned oil which got onto the market;
judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 1 April 1953, Lindenmaier-Mbhring, Nachslagewerks des
Bundesgerichtshofs (hereinafter cited L.MIJ No. 12 to Zivilprozessordnung § 286(C).
45. Where a silo was erected by defendant, but before it was properly secured it was
arbitrarily put to use by the owner, and the silo collapsed as a result of vibration, killing
several persons beneath, it was held that the manufacturer was liable to the third parties.
The grounds for the decision were that he had created a source of danger, and although he
knew or ought to have known of this danger, he did not take the necessary steps to avoid
it, but permitted it to persist; Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 8 July 1960, Vers. R. 1960, at
856.
46. Where people were infected with typhoid by milk from a dairy, the dairy was
held liable, even though there was no law requiring the pasteurization of milk. The court
said:
Although there is no legal obligation of pasteurization, the duty arises from running
a dairy-establishment for its director or owner not to let milk pass for consumption
without pasteurization, if he knows of circumstances giving rise to the suspicion the
typhoid bacilli might have gotten into the milk. It is established by judicial practice
that the exercise of a profession or trade brings about special duties of care towards
third parties who come within the scope of his trade ... beyond the general duties
of care towards all.
Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 16 December 1953, LW. § 832 (Eh) No. 3.
47. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 28 October 1959, Vers. R. 1962, a,. 140.
48. Von Caemmerer, op. cit. supra note 29, at 74.
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proper sense and has developed the general principle that one who creates a
source of danger must according to the circumstances undertake the security
measures necessary to protect third parties."49
But here a problem arises: This seemingly comprehensive duty of care of
the manufacturer towards the consumer contains a flaw which renders it largely
ineffective with regard to products manufactured by large enterprises. This flaw
is caused by a gap in the German law of vicarious liability. Strict liability of a
master for damage committed wrongfully by his servant in the scope of his
employment was not accepted by the German Civil Code. The draftsmen did
not want to abandon the principle of the earlier law that delictual liability is
justified only if the responsible person is himself at fault; this was in contrast
to contractual liability where, according to BGB section 278, an obligor is re-
sponsible for the fault of persons whom he employs in fulfillment of his obliga-
tion. 0 Responsibility of a master for his servant's acts in the course of employ-
ment has been based on the principle of underlying fault in selection and
supervision of the employee. Article 831 of the BGB provides as follows:
A person who employs another to do any work is bound to compensate
for any damage which the other unlawfully causes to a third party in
the performance of this work. The duty to compensate does not arise if
the employer has exercised ordinary care in the selection of the em-
ployee, and, where he has to supply appliances or implements or to
superintend work, has also exercised ordinary care as regards such
supply or supervision, or if the damage would have arisen, notwith-
standing the exercise of such care.
The same responsibility attaches to a person who, by contract with the
employer, undertakes to take charge of any of the affairs specified in
paragraph 1, sentence 2.
Thus the master is presumed to be responsible for the tort of his servant if he
cannot prove that no fault in selection or supervision is attributable to him.
The courts have established strict rules regarding the evidence necessary
for the exculpation of the master.5 ' These severe rules have been of no avail,
however, in larger industrial undertakings. As early as 1911, the Reichsgericht
came to the conclusion that in such enterprises the master cannot be expected
personally to select and control all his employees. If the functions of selection
and of control have been transferred to one or more higher employees, it is
sufficient if the master proves proper selection and supervision of the latter.52
This judicial practice has been adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof.53 The chain
49. judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 5 June 1960, Vers. R. 1961, at 139.
50. The draftsmen of the code rejected the proposal to follow Article 1384 of the
French Code civil partly for the reason that such unqualified responsibility would be
inequitable towards enterprises, and especially so towards artisans, carriers, etc.; see 2
Mugdan, Die gesammten Materialen zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch 1300 (1899).
51. S.E.S. v. H.C., Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), 25 February 1915, 87 R.G.Z. 1.
52. Allgemeine Berliner Omnibus-Aktiengesellschaft v. L., Reichsgericht (VI. Zivil-
senat), 14 December 1911, 78 R.G.Z. 107.
53. S.C. v. B., Bundesgerichtshof, 25 October 1951, 4 B.GMH.Z. 1 (selection of super-
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of command must still be established to the court's satisfaction. The burden is
on the master to find and name the person responsible for the harm and to show
his proper selection and supervision, or at least to show adequate selection and
supervision of all those persons who may have caused the damage.54 Furthermore,
the manufacturer must also show that his undertaking has been organized for
efficient control and for avoidance of possible dangers (so-called Organisations-
pfticht).5r Thus a manufacturer of soda water was held liable where the procedure
for checking pressure in the bottling process was inadequate, because the
workers were relieved at overlong intervals, permitting their attention to flag."0
The courts also differentiate, from the standpoint of vicarious liability,
between defective design or plan of mass-produced goods, and a defect in their
manufacture. Where the design is defective and a whole series of dangerous goods
is put on the market as a result, the manufacturer cannot exculpate himself
by proving proper control of the manufacturing process; upon him rests the
direct responsibility for ascertaining that the product will be safe.5 7 A manu-
facturing defect, on the other hand, is a fault in the individual product, and the
manufacturer may exculpate himself by proving proper selection and super-
vision. In fact, the courts seem to have gone even further and require the
plaintiff to produce proof of negligence on the part of either the manufacturer
or his employee.58
Even considering the various inroads upon the manufacturer's power to
exculpate himself for faults of his employees, it is apparent that the consumer's
chances of showing the manufacturer responsible for defective planning or
visor, if careful and under proper control, held sufficient to excuse owner of plant; not
necessary to prove that there was no fault committed by supervisor).
54. S.E.S. v. H.C., Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), 25 February 1915, 87 RG.Z. 1
(faulty control; glass in packaged medicinal salt); S.W. v. V.-M., Bundesgerichtshof, 4
November 1953, 11 B.G.H.Z. 151 (employer liable if his employees unlawfully fail to stop
systematic pilferage of owner's property during working hours); see also Judgment of
Bundesgerichtshof, 20 October 1958, Vers. R. 1959, at 104; Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof,
13 December 1960, Vers. R. 1961, at 139.
55. Soergel-Siebert, Biirgerllches Gesetzbuch § 831, Nos. 1, 45 (1962).
56. Judgment of Landgericht Hanau, Vers. R. 1956, at 785 (I was unable to read
this decision; see Simitis, op. cit. supra note 22, at 25; Markert, op. cit. supra note 22, at
233 n.49).
57. S.H.E.M. Comp. m.b.H. v. B., Reichsgericht (II. Zivilsenat), 17 January 1940,
163 R.G.Z. 21 (defective construction of the brake on a motor-car).
58. Where the purchaser of a bicycle was injured because a spoke was defective, the
defendant was held not to be responsible, the court saying:
Where the purchaser of one piece of a mass-produced article which showed an
individual defect in manufacture suffered damage in the course of its use, in an
action the entire burden of proof is upon him either to show that the manufacturer
was negligent, or that an employee of the manufacturer had caused the accident
(BGB Art. 831). If he wants to show the negligence of the management he must
assert and in the given case prove the existence of faults (defective assembly, use
of inadequate machines, inadequate supervision of workmen, and inadequate ex-
amination of products before they are put on the market). But he cannot rely on
the mere fact that a single defective piece of an assembled product, on the basis of
a mistake of a workman, has got on the market, as a proof of first impression that
the management was at fault.
Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 21 April 1956, Der Betriebs-Berater 1956, at 572.
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inadequate organization are not particularly promising. This has been much
criticized in legal literature, and a draft was recently put before the legislature
for a revision of BGB Article 831. 59
This inadequacy of the tort remedy has led also to attempts to ground the
claim of the consumer or third party on contractual liability of the manufacturer.
This means bringing the third party within the orbit of protection provided by
the contract between the manufacturer and the purchaser. The primary purpose
is to take advantage of the rule already mentioned that, where a party to a
contract employs an agent (his employee) in the fulfillment of his contractual
obligations, he becomes liable for the agent's fault without being able to
exculpate himself by proof of proper selection or control. Various means have
been looked to to bring about this result: the "liquidation of damages to the
benefit of a third party," the implied contract for the protection of a third
party,°0 and the implied extension of the seller's warranty.
German commercial law does not recognize a direct right of action by the
last buyer against his immediate seller in the chain of transactions for warranty
for hidden defects. However, in certain cases the courts have upheld the right
of one contracting party to sue the other contracting party for damages suffered
by a third person who was not a party to the contract. This situation is known
as "liquidation of damages to the benefit of a third party" (Drittschadens-
liquidation). It is generally held that an agent may demand compensation for
damage suffered by the principal on whose behalf he entered into a contract.6 1
This rule has been expanded to permit a party to claim compensation for
damage suffered by a third party in cases where, although the contract was not
made on the latter's behalf, the interests of the claimant are connected with those
of the third party in such a manner that the claimant must look after the third
party's interests, and this fact should have been reckoned with by the defend-
ant.62 This interpretation has also been accepted by the Bundesgerichtshof in a
59. Referentenentwurf des Bundesministers der Justiz (3430/11-11 549/59), which
would render the master equally responsible with his employee.
60. In addition to the works cited in note 21, supra, we may mention Gernhuber,
Drittwirkungen im Schuldverhiltnis kraft Leistungsniihe, in Festschrift fUr Arthur Nikisch
249 (1958); Tagert, Die Geltendmachung des Drittschadens (1938); Reinhardt, Der Ersatz
des Drittschadens (1933) (unfortunately the last two were unavailable to me).
61. Deutsches Reich v. G. & H., Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat), 15 January 1927, 115
R.G.Z. 419, at 425 (in this case, the forwarding agent sued for the loss of goods belonging
to his principal, which he had deposited).
62. Thus it was held that the hirer of a barge which was sunk because of the negli-
gence of a tug-boat contractor could sue the latter for damage, irrespective of whether he
himself had been sued by the owner of the barge; S.D. v. B., Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat),
11 May 1918, 93 R.G.Z. 39. In another case the defendant, a contractor, had to make
repairs in a municipal refrigerating plant, and through the fault of defendant's employee,
the plant was destroyed by fire; meat supplies belonging to local butchers, stored in the
plant, were lost. Although the municipality was not liable to the butchers for this damage,
it was held entitled to claim compensation for the loss. The Reichsgericht found here an
implied agreement for the "liquidation of damages in the interest of a third party" although
the municipality was not liable, and the third party had no contractual claim against the
defendant. Gerling-Konzern v. Maschfabr. G., Reichsgericht (VII. Zivilsenat), 18 December
1942, 170 R.G.Z. 246.
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case which did not involve product liability; in this case, it was held that when
someone has received into his possession, by contract or as a favor, a thing
belonging to another, and has made use of it in the performance of a contract
made with a third party, it will be presumed-unless the contrary is established
by the special circumstances of the case-that the contractual liability of the
(third) contracting party extends to the protection of the thing used in the
performance of the contract. It is not necessary that the contracting party know
that the thing used in performing the contract belonged to another.
0 3
This principle of "liquidation of damages to the benefit of a third party"
was only once applied to a situation which bears a superficial resemblance to a
case of product liability. A manufacturer of lubricating oils sold oil to a spinning
mill for its textile machinery. According to the manufacturer's representations,
the oil could be removed by washing. The mill produced thread for a textile fac-
tory which, in turn, used the thread to weave fabrics which were soiled and from
which the oilstains could not be removed. The spinning mill successfully sued the
oil manufacturer for the damages suffered by the textile factory.04
It appears, however, that the Bundesgerichtshof has refused to apply the
remedy of liquidation of damages to the benefit of a third party in product
liability cases. In a recent decision, 5 the defendant sold some green buckskin
to the plaintiff, from which the plaintiff made ladies' belts which it in turn sold to
two garment factories. The belts were used on dresses and sold to garment shops.
It was found that the leather had been defectively colored and had soiled a
number of the dresses. The plaintiff beltmaker sued the defendant for the damages
suffered by his customers although he had not himself been sued by the latter.
The action was dismissed, the court stating that in principle a buyer cannot sue
the seller for the damages suffered by his customers. In a careful judgment the
court considered the cases where third-party damages can be liquidated, namely,
the cases discussed above, and it held that in the product liability situation no
implied contractual term could be found without extending the subject matter
of the contract beyond the proper scope of interpretation.
This history of the action for liquidation of damages to the benefit of a
third party shows that it has little prospect of success in product liability cases.
Moreover, it seems that the courts restrict the applicability of this action to
damages done to property only.
0
63. S. Fa. Rh. v. H., Bundesgerichtshof, 23 November 1954, 15 B.G.H.Z. 224, at 229.
64. judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, 7 October 1959, Der Betrieb 1959, at 1083. This
important decision has not been reported elsewhere, and I have had only second-band in-
formation from: Markert, op. cit. supra note 22, at 235; Simitis, op. cit. supra, note 22 at 32;
and Lorentz, op. cit. supra note 22, at 80. The case is not typical, inasmuch as the damage
to the thread had already been done by the spinning-mill, but became manifest in the
plant of the third party. Apparently the manufacturer had also undertaken to indemnify
plaintiff for all damages suffered by third parties.
65. S.R. v. S., Bundesgerichtshof (VII. Zivilsenat), 10 July 1963, 40 B.G.H.Z. 91.
66. See 2 Staudinger-Ostler, Kommentar zum Birgerlichen Gesetzbuch-Recht der
Schuldverhaltnisse, 2 Teil § 433 No. 97a (11th ed. 1954); 3 Schlegelberger-Hefermehl, Kom-
mentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Handelskauf [hereinafter cited Schlegelberger-Hefermehl]
No. 50, at 2034. (3d ed. 1960).
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Another possible solution is based on an implied contract for the protection
of a third party who has suffered a personal injury as a result of defective
performance of a contract. Larenz called this the "contract with a protective
effect for third parties" (Vertrag mit Sckutzwirkung fir Dritte) ,6 a name which
has been adopted by the courts. This type of contractual liability toward third
parties was established by the Reichsgericht in reliance on BGB Article 328
which deals with third-party beneficiary contracts. 68 The first cases were those
where by necessary implication the subject matter of the contract was intended
to extend to third parties, like a lease of an apartment, which covered members
of the leaseholder's family who lived with him, or a contract of a parent with a
doctor, which was made for the benefit of the child to be treated.6 9 These narrow
holdings were extended by the Reichsgericht in 1930 when it held that a con-
tractor who had installed a gas meter so negligently that it exploded and injured
a cleaningwoman working in the household was contractually liable to the injured
person on the basis of an implied contract in favor of third parties.70 The implied
relationship of protection was based by the court on BGB Article 618, para-
graph 1, which provides that in a contract of service the master has a duty to
see that the rooms and implements to be used by his servants should be safe. In
view of this duty it must be implied that a contract of labor is to be carried out
in such a manner that neither the contracting master nor the members of his
family nor his servants shall be injured. This implied stipulation was established
by the courts exercising their power of suppletive interpretation (BGB Art. 157,
ergdinzende Vertragsauslegung).
This case law was also adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof, retaining the
requirement of special connection between the injured party and the obligor.7 1
The circle of protected persons must therefore remain limited and ascertainable.
This can be illustrated by a case involving the flywheel of a threshing machine.
The wheel was defectively adjusted by the contractor's employee and it came
off, injuring the plaintiff. At the time of the accident the machine was operating
not on the owner's land but on that of one J who had employed the plaintiff as
67. Larenz, Anmerkung (Casenote), 9 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter cited
NJ.W.] 1193 (1956).
68. Art. 328 reads:
An act of performance in favor of a third party may by contract be stipulated
for in such a manner that the third party acquires a direct right to demand the
performance.
In the absence of express stipulation, it is to be inferred from the circumstances,
especially from the object of the contract, whether a third party shall acquire the
right, whether the right of the third party shall arise forthwith or only under
certain conditions, and whether any right shall be reserved to the contracting parties
to take away or modify the right of the third party without his consent.
But see text following note 73.
69. S.R. v. K., Reichsgericht (I. Zivilsenat), 29 September 1936, 152 R.G.Z. 175.
70. Firma B. & R. v. A., Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), 10 February 1930, 127 R.G.Z.
218.
71. E.g., the lessor's duty toward his lessees, the creditor's relation to members of his
household or family, and the employer's duty toward his employees are based on BGB Art.
618.
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a helper. The claim was dismissed.72 The court pointed out that the owner had
the right to expect a safely-mounted machine; that the seller could not exculpate
himself for the negligence of his employee, who was his contractual agent (BGB
Art. 278); and that the buyer's contract extended to protect his workmen, to
whom he was obligated to provide safe implements and working conditions (BGB
Art. 618). But the court went on to say that the plaintiff did not belong to the
protected group because he worked for another employer who had borrowed the
threshing machine, and at the time the contract was made, the buyer had not
revealed an intention to lend his machine to another. Consequently, the plain-
tiff was beyond the ascertainable circle and had no valid claim.
Shortly thereafter, the court affirmed the view that the contractual duty of
care and protection should extend not only to the contracting party, but to
other ascertainable persons.7 3 This later decision is also interesting because the
court adopted the view of Professor Larenz that it was erroneous to assimilate
this contract to the third-party beneficiary contract. In the latter, the third
party immediately acquires a right to demand performance of the contract,
whereas in the former only the duties of care and protection arising out of the
contractual relationship are stipulated in his favor. This institution, as Larenz
pointed out, unlike the other, is not provided for in the code, but has been
created by judicial practice.
Considering the scope of contractual protection for the benefit of third
parties from the point of view of product liability, it is obvious that this offers
only a limited and partial solution. It is a remedy available to employees of the
purchaser or an equally narrow circle, but not to the general consumer of goods
at the end of a chain of transactions.
74
A third attempt to establish a contractual liability of the manufacturer has
been made on the basis of warranty. This possibility was considered in one of
the earliest cases by the Reichsgericht, where medical salt, sold in the original
wrapping by a pharmacist, contained glass. The court indicated that in addition
to the contract of sale with the original purchaser, there may be an implied
contract of warranty with the consumer for the unadulterated and careful
preparation of goods in their original wrapping. However, it held in this case
that the mere fact that the product was in the original package and that the
contents were indicated thereon was insufficient to establish an implied contract
of warranty.7 5 The idea of establishing the manufacturer's responsibility on the
basis of warranty (zugesicherte Eigenschaften) has been very popular with
72. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (VI. Zivilsenat), 25 April 1956, 9 NJ.W. 1193
(1956).
73. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (VI. Zivilsenat), 15 May 1999, 12 N.J.W. 1676
(1959). In this case the seller failed to warn against the inflammable nature of an anti-rust
paint, and a workman in a mining establishment was burned while using it. In this case too,
the court relied on BGB Art. 618, since the workman was within the circle of persons for
whose safety the owner (buyer) was responsible.
74. Markert, op. cit. supra note 22, at 234; Simitis, op. cit. supra note 22, at 28-32; 1
Larenz, Schuldrecht § 11 11 at 126-29 (7th ed. 1964).
75. SES. v. H.C., Reichsgericht (VI. Zivilsenat), 25 February 1915, 87 R.G.Z. 1, at 2.
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doctrinal writers, who discuss a variety of possibilities for development of
product liability on this foundation.
76
In practice, this approach does not seem to have been particularly success-
ful. One of the reasons is the language of the warranty itself. Where a manu-
facturer gives an express warranty, it is generally limited to a defect in the
object itself, and excludes further liability.77 Another reason is found in the
practice of the courts: warranted qualities cannot be implied from mere state-
ments concerning the serviceability or purpose of the goods, but must be
sought in an express undertaking by the seller that the goods sold are fit for a
particular purpose, or in circumstances extraneous to the description of the
product.78 The Bundesgerichtshof, although somewhat less exacting, requires
something more than general praise or permissible advertising in order to spell
out a warranty.79 So far, there has been one important case-decided in 1921-
where the mere description of quality was considered to be a warranty: seed
was sold as summer wheat and turned' out to be winter wheat8 0
Even where a warranty can be established, the problem still remains
whether it is an independent warranty-that is, a promise for the future, which
will ultimately benefit the consumer-or a dependent warranty (unselbstindige
Garantie), which refers to the contract of sale alone.8' In case of doubt, it will
be presumed to be the latter. Even where the warranty is dependent, however,
there is of course the possibility of a chain of recoveries for each purchaser
against his immediate seller, but we will not discuss here either the special
nature of these remedies, or the short period of limitation accompanying them.
8 2
To sum up, then, the establishment of a liability of the manufacturer on
the basis of promises made in the description of the goods on the original package
or, to go a step further, by the act of putting on the market mass-produced
goods under his trademark, is a future development not yet seriously considered
by the courts.
IV. FaENcia LAw
Product liability in French law does not have to face the difficulties which
have arisen in German law. It is true that here also we find a curious interplay
76. Simitis, op. cit. supra note 22, at 37 passim; Miller, op. dt. supra note 22, at 304;
and Markert, Haftung des Warenherstellers ohne Verschulden, 19 Der Betriebs-Berater 319
(1964) contain discussion of and references to these suggestions.
77. Clauses restricting responsibility to immediate (direct) damage are generally en-
forceable, unless they are contra bonos mores (BGB Art. 138) or against good faith (Art.
242).
78. Reichsgericht, Leipziger Zeitschrift, 1932 Sp. 956.
79. judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (VIII. Zivilsenat), 12 April 1959, 12 N.J.W. 1489
(1959).
80. S.S. v. T & X, Reichsgericht (III. Zivilsenat), 25 October 1921, 103 R.G.Z. 77.
81. See Schlegelberger-Hefermehl, at 2034-2035; 2 Soergel-Siebert, Biirgerliches Ge-
setzbuch, Vor § 459 No. 23, at 73 (1962).
82. The chain of recovery may easily be broken, if one of the intervening distributors
is not at fault. In this respect German law is rather lenient concerning the distributor's duty
of inspection of the goods. See BGH 15.3. 1956; Der Betrieb 1956, at 348.
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of tort and contract, but this affects the relationship of the manufacturer to the
purchaser rather than the claim of the ultimate consumer.
French law, in a few broad provisions, adopted a general theory of tort (or,
rather, "delictual") liability. There are a mere five articles in the Civil Code
88
on delictual liability, the most important of which is Article 1382: "Every act
by which a person causes damage to another makes the person by whose fault
the damage occurred liable to make reparation for such damage." A similar
responsibility arises for damage caused by a wrongful omission (responsabilitM
quasi-delictuelle, Art. 1383). The code also imposes vicarious liability upon
parents, employers and teachers, and a kind of strict liability on persons who
have in their care things which cause damage. Finally, it establishes the strict
liability of the owners of animals and buildings, respectively (Arts. 1385 and
1386).
Thus we see that it is a fundamental principle of French law that liability
for damages is based on fault (faute).84 Consequently, a plaintiff must show
that he suffered damage, and that this was caused by a wrongful act or omission
of the defendant. A third-party consumer who suffers harm as a result of a
defect in a product can recover damages in a tort action against the manufac-
turer if he can prove that the manufacturer's negligence caused the injury.
Since in French law the employer is liable for the fault of his employees, he will
also be responsible for the negligence of his workmen. Nevertheless, to furnish
affirmative proof of negligence and of causal connection will not always be easy.
The task of the injured party would be much simpler if he could sue the seller
of the defective product on the basis of the presumption of fault established by
Article 1384, paragraph 1, as a "person... responsible... for the damage...
which is caused by the action ... of things in his care." At this point, however,
the law of contract comes into play because of the contractual relationship
between seller and consumer. We must pause to consider two matters relevant to
our problem.
One is the so-called "principle of non-cumul" by which the law refuses to
permit a person to cumulate contractual and delictual remedies. Although a
breach of contract may also consist in a negligent act causing injury, if the
defective execution of an obligation arose out of a contract, the injured person
can only rely on a contractual remedy. The question of non-cumul is somewhat
confused because of a number of decisions in borderline cases where different
courts have evaluated similar facts differently,"8 but there is no doubt that the
83. Code civil [hereinafter cited C. civ.].
84. The fundamental principle of liability for fault has been abandoned by the courts.
judicial practice has established a kind of strict general liability for things in one's care,
on the basis of Art. 1384, para. 1: "A person is liable not only for the damage he causes by
his own act, but also for that caused... by things that he has under his guard." This form
of liability is a form of presumption of fault for injury caused by things under his care,
which can only be rebutted by defendant by proving affirmatively that the cause of the
injury was the fault of the victim or of a third party, or of cas fortuit or force majeure.
This type of strict liability is the responsabilit6 du fait des choses.
85. A plaintiff in a self-service market put the selected goods before the cashier, and
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present trend excludes the possibility of a tort action where there is a contractual
relationship between the parties.8 6
The second preliminary observation concerns the remedies available as a
consequence of warranty arising from the law of sales. The seller, according to
a provision of Article 1641 of the Civil Code, impliedly warrants that the goods
have no hidden defects which would render them inappropriate for the use for
which they were purchased. The remedies against the seller for hidden defects
are found in two articles of the code:
Article 1645: If the vendor knew of the defects of the thing, he is
bound not only to return the price which he has received, but he is also
liable to the purchaser for all damages.
Article 1646: If the vendor was ignorant of the defects of the thing, he
shall only be bound to return the price and to reimburse the purchaser
for the expenses occasioned by the sale.
The scope of the warranty arising from a sale is especially relevant where the
manufacturer is also a vendor, and his product has injured the purchaser in-
directly by causing damage to the third party who may sue the purchaser on the
basis either of a contract or of a delictual claim. The warranty distinguishes
between the vendor who knew of the defects, 87 and the vendor ignorant of them.
Where the vendor knew of the defects, he is liable to the purchaser for all the
damages which he has suffered, that is, for injuries suffered not only by the
purchaser but those suffered by others, for which the purchaser is responsible.88
The vendor's gross negligence is assimilated to actual knowledge of the defects,
because Article 1645 aims at the bad faith of the vendor.
If the vendor acted in good faith, which means he did not know of the
hidden defects, he is liable only for restitution of the price and for expenses
while these goods were being put into a bag a bottle of soda-water exploded and injured
plaintiff's eye. The court had to decide whether there had been a contract of sale, in which
case there was, in addition to warranty, an obligation of security (obligation de securitM)
(which in French law is a form of strict liability, as to which see note 98 infra), a breach of
which would establish defendant's liability, unless there had intervened an extraneous cause.
In this case the court found that selection of the articles was sufficient to establish a sale.
St. des Eaux minrales Vittel v. dame Morel D'Arlieux, SA.RJL. Supermag-Rennes et
Sc6. des Verreries de Gironcourt, Cour de Paris, 14 dicembre 1961, [19622 Jurisclasseur
P~riodique [hereinafter J.C.P.] II. 12547 et note Savatier.
86. See, e.g., Judgment of Cour de Cassation (Ch. Civ.), 6 Avril 1927, [1927] Sirey
Recueil CAn~rale [hereinafter cited S.] I. 207 (Fr.), et note H. Mazeaud. In this decision
the Cour de Cassation clearly stated the point: "It is only in matters of delict and quasi-
delict (negligence) that any fault obliges the person who caused it to repair the damage
resulting from his act; articles 1382 et. seq. of the Code civil are not applicable when it is
a question of a fault committed by non-performance of an obligation arising out of a
contract." See 1 Mazeaud-Tunc, Traiti thorique et pratique des responsabilit6 civile [here-
inafter cited Mazeaud-Tunc] Nos. 173-207, at 226-59 (6th ed. 1965) for detailed discussion
and case references.
87. It is always a question of hidden defects, because defects which are known to or
easily discoverable by the purchaser do not result in liability of the seller.
88. H. Mazeaud, La responsabiliti civile du vendeur-fabricant, [hereinafter cited
H. Mazeaud] 53 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 611 (1955); 10 Planiol-Ripert-Hamel,
Trait6 pratique de droit civil Franqaise thereinafter cited Planiol-Ripert-Hamel] 151 (1956).
For a careful and detailed discussion, see also Ficker, Die Schadenersatzpfficht des Verkiiufers
und seiner Vorminner bei Sachm~ingen in der Franzbsischen Rechtsprechung (1962).
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incurred in the course of the sale (les frais occasionn~s par la vente). This
would mean expenses of transport, transfer fees, expenses of sale to sub-pur-
chasers, and the like. The courts have, however, extended the scope of expenses
to "sums which the purchaser has been condemned to pay,"180 an interpretation
which has been much criticized. This extensive interpretation of warranty
becomes especially severe when it concerns a manufacturer or distributor as
vendor. According to the old adage unusquisque peritus esse debet artis suae,
a vendor who is a manufacturer or a professional merchant is supposed, by
reason of his experience, to know of the hidden vices of the goods.10 This
principle has been accepted by French judicial practice0 ' and is considered an
irrebuttable presumption which will always render the manufacturer or pro-
fessional merchant responsible for all damages suffered by the buyer,0 2 including
the costs the latter has had to pay in damages to the injured sub-purchaser or
third parties.
The obligation of warranty of the vendor, however, can be excluded by
express stipulation under Art. 1643. If a clause excluding responsibility is con-
tained in the contract of sale, will it be effective? In general, there are two
exceptions to the validity of such a clause in a contract: the clause is ineffective
if the cause of damage is a fraudulent (dol) act of the vendor, and if bodily
injury is caused by the vendor.
93
If a vendor knew of the hidden defects of the object sold, he is acting in bad
faith, his act is fraudulent, and he cannot rely on the clause of non-responsibility.
The courts equate gross negligence and fraud, and consequently gross negligence
will also nullify the effectiveness of the clause.0 4 It is not yet settled whether the
courts include the presumption of knowledge on the part of the manufacturer
and trader within the scope of fraud for the purpose of the above rule, but the
89. Judgment of Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), 21 octobre 1925, [1926] Dalloz Juris-
prudence (hereinafter cited D.] I. 9, et note Josserand [strongly critical]; Judgment of Cour
de Cassation (Ch. Civ.), 15 mars 1948, [1948] D. 346; Judgment of Cour d'Appel de Rouen,
6 juin 1956, 1957 D. Som. 43. The standing practice accepted this interpretation despite doc-
trinal criticism; see 3 Mazeaud-Tunc No. 2190, at 309 (5th ed. 1960).
90. Pothier, Trait6 du contrat de vente, No. 214, at 89 (1861).
91. Thus in Judgment of Cour d'Appel de Chambery, 23 novembre 1908, 1912 D. II.
103, the court said: "The merchant or manufacturer, who sold a thing which is an object of
his trade, will be considered to have known the defects of the subject of litigation. Because
he knew the vice he has to pay damages." And in Gaz et Electricit6 de France v. Etablisse-
ments Jacob Holtzer, Cour de Cassation (Ch. Civ., ire sect.), 24 novembre 1954, [1955]
J.C.P. II. 8565, it was said: "As a result of provisions of art. 1645 ...the vendor who
knew the defects is obligated to purchaser for all damages which he suffered; assimilated to
such vendor is one who on the basis of his profession ought to have known the defects."
92. 10 Planiol-Ripert-Hamel 153. It seems that Belgian courts permit the vendor to
exculpate himself by proving all necessary care on his part; see Judgment of Cour de
Cassation, 13 novembre 1959, [1960] J.T. 59 (Bel.). And see Van Haecke, La rdsponsabiitd
du jabricant, 14 Revue Critique de Jurisprudence Beige 212-23 (1960).
93. H. Mazeaud, op. cit. supra note 88, at 619; 10 Planiol-Ripert-Hamel No. 139, at
158-60.
94. 3 Mazeaud-Tunc No. 2523, at 671-72 (Sth ed. 1960). The courts have, however,
established two exceptions; they give effect to the clause excluding liability in contracts of
carriage by rail and of marine transport in spite of gross negligence.
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tendency of the judicial practice is to hold non-responsibility clauses inapplicable
to manufacturers and traders.95
The second exception to clauses of non-responsibility is based upon the
principle that a person cannot dispose of his life or his body.96 Consequently,
the clause cannot be applied in the event of harm to life or limb.
It may also be pointed out that, as far as third parties are concerned, these
clauses obviously cannot come into play for two reasons: there is no contractual
relation between these persons and the vendor, and the courts will not enforce
clauses of non-responsibility in claims based on tort.
In the light of what has been said above, we turn again to the scope of
liability of manufacturers and sellers. Several situations may be examined. A
defective product injures a person who has purchased it from the manufacturer
or intermediate vendor. His remedy is in contract; he cannot rely on a tort
claim. On the basis of the strict liability arising out of warranty, he will be able
to recover all his damages.97 It is important, however, to distinguish the case
where the injury was not due to any defect in the product, but occurred because
the product was used improperly by the purchaser, as a result of inadequate
instructions or lack of warning by the manufacturer. In this case the manufac-
turer has failed in his obligation of security 98 and he will be liable in tort if he
is at fault.99
There may be cases where the consumer has remedies against both the
manufacturer and the seller, the one delictual and the other contractual.100 It
95. E.g., Judgment of Cour d'Appel de Grenoble, 20 novembre 1952, [1953] D. 503:
"The manufacturer of a motor cannot plead ignorance of a defect of a thing manufactured
and sold by him. Consequently he cannot escape responsibility by a clause of non-responsi-
bility." This interpretation has also been applied to professional merchants; see, e.g., Judg-
ment of Court d'Appel de Rennes, 25 novembre 1955, [1956] Gaz. Pal. I. 137. Numerous cases
are discussed in Ficker, op. cit. supra note 88, at 69-73.
96. 3 Mazeaud-Tunc No. 2529, at 677-78 (5th ed. 1960).
97. The only problem which may arise here is the short statute of limitations (brel
dlai). The law does not fix the time limit but merely states (C. civ. Art. 1648) that it
should be a short delay according to the nature of the defect or the usage of the place
where the sale was made. The courts of first instance have discretion concerning local
customs and the diligence of the purchaser; 10 Planiol-Ripert-Hamel No. 136, at 155-57.
98. The obligation of security (obligation de securit6) is a specific obligation, whenever
in the course of performance of a contract there is a probability that the promisee may be
exposed to injury. In such cases it is a burden on the promisor to see to it that the promisee
should remain safe and sound. Thus in contracts of carriage, the promise is to the effect that
the promisee shall arrive at his destination safe and sound; if this does not happen the
promisor has failed in his obligation of security and is presumed to be at fault and re-
sponsible for any harm done, unless he can rebut this presumption. See 1 Mazeaud-Tunc
Nos. 150-62 (6th ed. 1965).
99. Judgment of Cour de Cassation (Ch. req.), 5 mai 1924, [19241 D.H. 433 (absence
of instructions for handling explosives); Judgment of Cour d'Appel de Douai, 4 juin 1954,
[1954) D.J. 708 (absence of instruction for adjusting vegetable mixer). No liability arises,
however, where the purchaser in consequence of his profession should have known the
necessary precautions, or if he did not know them, should have taken steps to find out
about them. See Judgment of Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ., sect. comm.), 4 d6cembre 1950,
[1950] Bulletin des arr~ts de la Cour de Cassation II. 261; see also H. Mazeaud, at 618.
100. Thus where a chemical (dermite) used in making permanent waves for ladies
caused a serious dermatitis, the court held the hairdresser contractually liable in damages to
his client on the basis of his obligation of security, and held the manufacturer liable in
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may also happen that the seller will be held liable even though he has no
redress against the manufacturer or vendor.10 1 Where the injury is caused to a
third party, his remedy, if he can prove negligence, will be against the manu-
facturer and the vendor, but he may also have a claim in strict liability against
the purchaser who had the thing under his control when it caused injury to the
third party; 0 2 in this case, the purchaser will also have redress against the
vendor if he can prove a hidden defect or other non-performance of a contractual
duty.
Finally, we may consider the relations among the chain of purchasers.
'Where there has been a series of sales of the same thing, the last buyer may
invoke.., the warranty against hidden defects,... either against his immediate
seller or against any previous seller in the chain, until he finds one that is solvent.
He may either employ the action oblique, 03 or bring an action directe, relying
upon the doctrine that each successive sale implies a transfer of all rights of
action relating to the thing sold."' 0 4 The action directe is an interesting and
peculiar institution of French law, which has aroused much interest. 05 It seems,
however, that where a sub-purchaser brings a claim for damages against the
manufacturer, the present trend of the courts is to consider him a third party,
and hence he will have only a tort action, 10 and cannot rely on the action
directe.
contract for the damages suffered by the hairdresser, for providing a product which he (the
manufacturer) knew or ought to have known was capable of causing harm, and further held
the manufacturer liable in negligence to the client for not having warned the users of his
product about possible harm and about precautions for avoiding it; Tripault v. Dame
Br&illon et Soc. Cadorcin, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 18 f6vrier 1957, [1957] J.C.P. II. 9944;
confirmed, Cour de Cassation (Ch. civ.), 5 mai 1959, [1959] 3.CP. 11. 11159.
101. This happened in the case where a bottle in a self-service market exploded and
injured the consumer; see note 85, supra. The seller was found responsible on the basis of
his obligation of security. The manufacturer was in no contractual relation to the consumer,
and could only have been held liable if the latter could have proven a fault; he was' not
liable in strict liability because the bottle was no longer in his care. The vendor (market)
failed to produce the pieces of the bottle, and thus could not prove any hidden defects; the
market thus lost the possibility of redress against the manufacturer; StO. des Eaux min~rales
Vittel v. dame Morel D'Arlieux, SA.R.L. Supermag-Rennes et Sc6. des Verrerles de Giron-
court, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 14 dcembre 1961, [1962] J.C.P. II. 12547.
102. It would be going too far to consider the whole area of who is in control of the
thing which caused damage, but the owner is generally considered to be in control, unless he
has relinquished his control in such a manner that the latter is capable of preventing all harm
caused. Thus where bottles of liquid oxygen were refilled, the bottles remaining the property
of the vendor while transported, and they exploded at the moment the transporter delivered
them to the purchaser, injuring several persons, the owner was held liable; he controlled the
bottles which exploded as a result of some unexplained internal cause (probably corrosion);
judgment of Cour de Cassation (Ch. Civ., sect. 2e.), 10 juin 1960, [1960] J.C.P. II. 11824 et
note Esmein.
103. By the action oblique creditors are entitled to take advantage of all the rights
and causes of action of their debtor except those which are purely personal; see C. civ. Art.
1166.
104. Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law 362-63 (2d ed. 1963); cf. 10 Planiol-
Ripert-Hamel No. 104.
105. See Ficker, op. cit. supra note 88, at 118-37 for an excellent description of this;
see also Wahl, Vertragsanspriiche Dritter im franzosischen Recht unter Vergleichung mit
dem deutschen Recht dargestelit an der Hand der File der action directe (1935).
106. 1 Mazeaud-Tunc No. 181, at 235 (6th ed. 1965); see also St6. des Eaux mint-rales




We have now considered the problem of product liability in three different
legal systems. The law in the United States makes the boldest and most success-
ful approach. It is true that this law may be considered an "open system," not
too much hampered by systematic and conceptual niceties, and free to reach
policy decisions. English common law, by contrast, has been more hesitant to
abandon fundamental principles, as in the case of extension of implied warranty
beyond the scope of contract.
German law, with its careful and precise code definitions and its adherence
to principles, has had to face more obstacles than the others. The principle of
personal fault as a basis of liability established by BGB Article 831 has been a
barrier to the satisfactory solution of the manufacturer's responsibility for
defective products. Possibly this principle will be abandoned by new legislation,
but the laborious attempts to fill the gap by implied contractual obligations have
not been notably successful, again because of conceptual obstacles or, rather,
because the fundamental principle of "privity" in a contract relationship can-
not easily be disregarded in a legal system which is truly systematic.
French law has been able to find a more-or-less satisfactory solution because
of the broad and loose concept of tort liability, which reflects the optimism of
the Enlightment.10 7 The broad and far-reaching remedies available are made
even more so by the perhaps overly severe interpretation of warranty against
manufacturers and traders.
It is one thing to show how a problem is solved by "radically different
techniques," and another to find a satisfactory explanation, deeper than the
somewhat superficial differences of principles and codified definitions. This can
only be attempted by an intensive historical and sociological analysis, which is
beyond the scope of this article and probably also beyond this writer's qualifica-
tions.
court, Cour d'Appel de Paris, 14 decembre 1961, [19621 J.C.P. II. 12547 et note Savatier;
[19621 Rev. trim. droit civ. 314 where it is said by A. Tunc: "Although eminent authors have
expressed contrary opinions and in spite of the alleged principle of the relativity of con-
tracts . . . it seems, in effect, that the action of a sub-purchaser against a manufacturer
can only be a delictual action?'
107. These very general provisions have led, however, to an extensive case law, which
to some extent has become chaotic; see 1 Mazeaud-Tunc, Avant-propos de la sixiame edition,
at 1 (1965).
